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ABSTRACT 
 
This article intends to explore the relationship between liquidity constraints faced by 
households and their participation in the tenancy market, using original data from Madagascar 
and a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis. By showing how households 
combine credit and land inputs in their strategies and behavior, the paper intends to bridge 
gaps between the often disconnected strands of literature dealing with credit on the one side, 
land markets on the other side. Our results show that liquidity constraints play a role both on 
the supply and on the demand side. On the supply side, they contribute to the decision to lease 
out land, and the nature of the constraint can drive the contractual choice: fixed-rent with ex 
ante payment in case of immediate need of cash, share-tenancy otherwise …. On the demand 
side, liquidity constraints drive the contractual choice towards share tenancy. As such, share 
tenancy can be conceived of as a compromise for household who face liquidity constraints on 
both supply and demand side. Our data also indicate that the level of fixed-rent is 
substantially lower than the expected value of the share of the production in the case of share 
tenancy. The difference can be interpreted as a quasi-loan from landowners to tenants, even 
when landowners are themselves liquidity constrained for the cultivation of their plots. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Keywords: Liquidity constraints, Tenancy market, Madagascar.  
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1 Introduction 
Land and financial capacities are critical inputs for agricultural production and 
income of rural households in developing countries (Deininger and Feder, 2001; World-Bank, 
2007; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). Land and credit markets are often dealt with separately in 
the literature on development economics, although empirical data on household strategies and 
behavior indicate that land and finance interact in many ways. This article sets out to explore 
the interaction between these two markets based on original household data collected in 
Madagascar.  
Credit markets imperfections cause differential access to credit for households. This 
differential access to credit may have different effects on how individuals participate in 
tenancy market: liquidity constraints may determine the households mode of production 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986); households can participate in land tenancy market under 
interlinked contracts in which landowner may provide credit to tenant who faced liquidity 
constraints in the financing of production costs (Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; Bardhan, 1980; 
Braverman and Srinivasan, 1981) or under reverse tenancy contracts in which the tenant is 
richer than the landowner (Singh, 1989; Amblard and Colin, 2009); poor households can have 
restrictions on contractual choice (it might be difficult for them to contract under fixe-rent 
contract with ex ante payment of the rent), this can generate distress renting: credit markets 
imperfections may influence the insurance mechanisms of tenancy market (Deininger, 2003). 
Liquidity constraints can influence the tenancy market participation of “Constrained 
Households” and tenancy can allow them to overcome liquidity constraints some of which 
derive from credit market imperfection. These strategies can be a an institutional response to 
credit markets imperfections (Bardhan, 1991).  
In this article, we intend to test the relationship between households’ liquidity 
constraints and their participation to tenancy market using an original database from Lake 
Alaotra region with combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis. In Lake Alaotra 
region (“rice bowl of Madagascar”), land tenancy market is active and the analysis of 
motivations in land tenancy market participation can be related to liquidity constraints. Our 
data on credit encompass both formal and informal credit sources and data on tenancy market 
both on the demand side and the supply side. These data allow us to construct a "liquidity 
constraints" variable that goes beyond the usual dichotomy access/ no access to credit and we 
analyse the effect of liquidity constraints on: (i) tenancy market participation (leases in or not, 
leases out or not), (ii) intensity of participation (area leased in), and (iii) contractual choice 
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(rent in/share in, rent out/share out). Our results show that liquidity constraints play a role in 
the decision to lease land (in/out) and in the contractual choice.  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an overview of the literature on 
participation in land tenancy markets and credit markets, and the interactions between the 
two; section 3 present data and qualitative overview, section 4, empirical analysis and results. 
Finally, section 5 concludes.    
2 Review of the literature  
2.1 Land tenancy market: determinants and contractual forms. 
2.1.1 Household’s participation in tenancy market 
Households’ participation in tenancy market can be influenced by a set of factors 
(Holden et al., 2009). For some authors, households use this market to equilibrate inputs, such 
as family labor and draft power, to ownership land holdings (Skoufias, 1995). This view fits 
broadly into the models based on factor endowments (land, labor, oxen, productive assets…). 
For Skoufias (1995), the key element of all models on factor endowments is that the costs 
associated with transactions involving these factors are such that they lead to imperfections or 
lack of markets on these factors. Household who participate in tenancy market may solve this 
problem by looking for a partner who has the assets he don’t have (Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1985). So, household who have small areas compared to their labor force can be motivated to 
increase their farmed areas or rent the surplus labor on the labor market. On the other side, 
those who have important land areas compared to their labor force, can lease out all or a part 
of their land in the tenancy market or seek for hired labour (Otsuka et al., 1992).  
Credit (and insurance) market imperfections can lead household to have different 
access to credit market and then to tenancy markets and different mode of production 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Kochar, 1997). Interlinked contracts where transactions involves 
credit and land is often related to an opportunity for landlord to internalise externalities 
generated by moral hazard considerations when production uncertainty and information 
asymmetries between agents prevail (Bardhan, 1980; Braverman and Guasch, 1986; Eswaran 
and Kotwal, 1986; Shetty, 1988; Swain, 1999). This view is derived form only landowner 
point of view. On the demand side, interlinked contracts can be an opportunity for the tenant 
to solve the liquidity constraints he faced. 
For Holden et al (2009: 22): “A broader perspective on land market participation 
takes into account trust, reputation, and availability of potential partners (landlords and 
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tenants) in assessing the functioning of the market. If the initial fixed costs for farming are 
high, this may also contribute to a land market entry barrier. Likewise, transaction cost related 
to search for partners, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement of contract can hinder and 
reduce the degree of participation.” 
2.1.2 Contractual choice: sharecropping versus fixed-rent contract 
In the literature on tenancy markets, sharecropping is often presented as an 
inefficient mode of production. Indeed, if the effort of tenant cannot be controlled by the 
landlord (moral hazard), tenant has an incentive to undersupply his effort because he should 
pay some fraction of the output (Marshall, 1920). In considering others factors such as risk, 
transaction costs, market imperfections, neo institutional theories provide an analytical 
framework for the analysis of contractual choice. 
The risk aversion of households can affect their contractual choices. Risk adverse 
households may prefer a share contract than a lease contract because in lease contract only 
landowner or tenant bear all the production. In share tenancy contract, output sharing permit 
to deal the production risk between the landlord and the tenant (Stiglitz, 1974; Allen and 
Lueck, 1995).  
Differences in factors endowment (indivisible assets, mechanization, land and family 
labour) of household and their characteristics (managerial ability, access to credit) may lead 
household to choose share tenancy contract (resource pooling) in order to have access to the 
factors they don’t have. The others households who would enhance their skills may choose 
fixed-rent contracts (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Shetty, 1988; Skoufias, 1995). 
Tenure security can be also a potential determinant of households’participation. 
Household in many studies consider fixed-rent more riskier than sharecropping contract   
(Bellemare, 2009; Macours et al., 2010). 
Some transaction costs may result from the monitoring of hired labour. Information 
asymmetries about hired labour and labour market imperfections may increase transaction 
costs in looking for skilled hired labour (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986; Otsuka et al., 1992; 
Deininger, 2003). When they might be too high, landowners are more likely to choose a share 
tenancy contract than a process of production with hired labour (Murrell, 1983; Allen and 
Lueck, 1993). Landowners may also rent out their land but this can lead to an overexploitation 
of land quality (Dubois, 1999). 
Another factor that may affect contractual choice is liquidity constraints. In this case, 
sharecropping is rarely seen as the result of financial constraints (lack of access to credit and 
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low accumulation) faced by the tenants or owners. However, in these circumstances it may be 
difficult to finance agricultural production and contractual choice may reflect household 
liquidity constraints. So, fixed-rent contract with an ex-ante payment may not be feasible for 
poor household, and individuals are thus more likely to engage in sharecropping contracts, 
while better-off tenants can seek for fixed-rent contract (Colin and Bouquet, 2001; Colin, 
2005). This question of the relationship between liquidity constraints and household’s 
participation in land tenancy market is the concern of this article.  
2.2 Rural credit market: features and implications for tenancy market 
 Participation in credit markets can allow household to alleviate their liquidity 
constraints. However rural credit markets is characterised by the phenomenon of rationing 
which can increase household’s liquidity constraints. Calomiris and Longholer (2008:1) 
define rationing as “a situation in which lenders are unwilling to advance additional funds to 
borrowers at the prevailing market interest rate”. According to this definition, rationing can be 
view as a phenomenon which emerges from supply side (credit restriction, credit refusal…) 
and which is related to either information asymmetries between households and credit 
institutions (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) or government intervention : interest ceiling rates, 
direct credit...(Kochar, 1997; Conning and Udry, 2007). Rationing can also emerge from 
demand side when households take into account their risk aversion (possibility to lose 
collateral), transaction costs (credit application) in their decision to participate or not in the 
credit markets (Boucher and Guirkinger, 2007; Guirkinger, 2008; Boucher et al., 2009). So, 
there are several sources of rationing depending on whether one is on the supply side or on the 
demand side of the credit market.  
Rationing increase households liquidity constraints and this may have effect on 
their tenancy market participation.Theoretically households’ liquidity constraints can have 
different effects on their tenancy market participation. On the supply side, landowners who 
faced urgent need of liquidity may require a fixed-rent with an ex-ante payment of the rent. 
When liquidity constrains is related to the financing of production costs, landowners can seek 
for a rich tenant (reverse tenancy). 
On the demand side, liquidity constraints make fixe-rent contract difficult to have for 
poor households. Sharecropping with cost sharing can help both landowner and tenant 
overcome some liquidity constraints (Braverman and Guasch, 1986; Eswaran and Kotwal, 
1986; Shetty, 1988; Basu, 1995; Deininger, 2003).  
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2.3 Household’s liquidity constraints and land tenancy market in 
Madagascar.  
According to the literature, land tenancy market is relatively common in Madagascar, 
particularly in  peri-urban areas and in areas where land has a greater agricultural value 
(Minten and Razafindraibe, 2003). These authors distinguish between two categories of 
landowners (poor ones and rich ones) and identify quite different motivations behind leasing 
out for each category. For poor landowners, lack of liquidity to finance hired labour and 
marketed inputs are the main reasons to lease out land. For rich landowners, other reasons can 
drive them to lease out land including lack of time to monitor hired labour, distant plots, low 
quality of land. The most common contracts are fixed-rent contracts with ex-ante payment of 
the rent and  share-tenancy contracts with ex-post payment of the rent; the most common 
sharing rates of output are ½ and 1/3 in favour of landowners (Minten and Razafindraibe, 
2003). About credit markets, Zeller (1994:11-12) states that the financial sector in 
Madagascar (formal and informal) “ration loan demands in view of total household wealth 
and of leverage of the household, which is defined as the ratio of outstanding debt service 
obligations over income”. This generates inequalities in loan rationing between the poorer and 
the richer households. However, land is not a criterion for rationing for formal and informal 
lenders (Zeller, 1994).    
In the highland of Madagascar and especially in Lake Alaotra region (“rice bowl of 
Madagascar”), the land tenancy market is very active and most of studies relate motivations in 
leasing in and leasing out mainly to the lack of productive assets: oxen, mechanization, labour 
(Charmes, 1975; Jarosz, 1991; Karsenty and Le Roy, 1996). Bellemare (2009) relate the 
predominance of share tenancy in reverse tenancy contract to the probability for the 
landowners to lose their plot which is higher in fixe-rent contract than in share tenancy 
contract: weak property rights effect. This rationale derives from only the point of view of 
landowner. In our study, we intend to take into account both landowner and tenant point of 
view and relate the predominance of share tenancy contract in general to liquidity constraints 
effects for both landowners and tenants. To our knowledge, few studies on Lake Alaotra 
region analyse the role of liquidity constraints on households’ participation and contract 
choice in tenancy market. However, our qualitative surveys show that liquidity constraints are 
one the main determinants of households’ participation in tenancy market in Lake Alaotra 
region.  
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3 Data and descriptive statistics  
3.1 Data  
The data were collected in the lac Alaotra region during October 2009. Lac Alaotra is 
located 300 km to the northeast of Antananarivo, the country’s capital, and constitutes the 
most important rice-growing region of Madagascar. Tenancy market is very active (Charmes, 
1976; Karsenty and Le Roy, 1996; Barrett et al., 2009) and  formal credit market have 
experienced significant development in recent years. Formal and informal credits coexist and 
finance rural and agricultural activities (Wampfler et al., forthcoming).  
For our study, we use two types of data: the first relies on qualitative and explorative 
interviews on 41 households who are a subsample of our quantitative surveys.  These 
households were asked about their practices, their motivations in lease in or lease out land, 
and about the general patterns in the villages on land tenancy markets. Households’ 
characteristics on rural credit markets (formal and informal) were also explored.  
The second dataset relies on quantitative surveys on 448 households in 5 communes 
and 10 fokontany (Village) around Lake Alaotra. The sampling methodology was as follows: 
first, the 5 communes were selected on the basis of whether or not an offer of formal credit 
exists. In each commune, we selected 2 fokontany on the basis of their relative accessibility 
and 40 households in each fokontany in order to over-represent
4
 household who participate in 
formal credit market. This survey covers households’ activities, credit markets and tenancy 
market participation during June 2008-June 2009. The design of the survey questionnaire was 
adapted from other surveys undertaken in Latin America under the basis project (Boucher et 
al., 2009). On the household's credit markets participation (formal and informal), we have 
detailed data on amounts received, the gap between amount which was applied for and the 
amount received, the household's motivations when they didn't make an application in credit 
markets... These data allow us to construct a "liquidity constraints" variable that goes beyond 
the use of the amount of credit received or the usual dichotomy access/ no access to credit of 
in the literature (Kochar, 1997; Stephens and Barrett, 2011). Regarding tenancy market 
participation, we have detailed data on the different types of contract, the crops in these 
contracts, the household’s rationales in their participation in tenancy market, and their 
preference about the different contracts. 
                                                 
4
 All descriptive statistics and regressions were reweighted according to our sampling design   
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
About households’ participation on tenancy market, our sample contains 295 
households (66%) who participate (546 contracts) in land tenancy market (table 1). According 
to the characteristics of the region, the paddy fields are the main type of land in tenancy 
market.  
We have more households who declare their contracts on the demand side (222 
households-400 contracts) than on the supply side (98 households-146 contracts). The low 
level of reported fixed-rent contracts on the supply side is the main reason (25 contracts). In 
this region, our qualitative survey indicates that leasing out land under fixed-rent contract is 
generally associated with a downward spiral of impoverishment and indebtedness. These 
effects can be related to an existence of liquidity constraints which prevent households to 
undertake income-generating activities. It is therefore no surprise that households be reluctant 
to declare this type of contract.  These probable underreporting of fixed-rent contract could 
reduce the efficiency of the contractual choice estimation on the supply side. 
Most of the fixed-rent contracts are characterized by an ex-ante cash payment of the 
rent. According to other findings in Madagascar (Minten and Razafindraibe, 2003), these 
characteristics may  indicate that landowners need cash and don’t have an alternative source 
of funding. Share tenancy contracts are characterized by an ex-post payment of the rent and 
the most common sharing rates of output are ½ in favour of landowners. In 78% of 
sharecropping contracts, landowners and tenants share the cost of various inputs. So, this high 
percentage implies that sharecropping, according to the literature, can be a possible way for 
the households (either landowner or tenants or both) to equilibrate differences in the tradable 
and non-tradable inputs.  
Table 1 : households’ tenancy market participation in our sample 
 Lease out Lease in 
Total 
Type of contract Sharecropping Fixed-rent Total lease out sharecropping Fixed-rent Total lease in 
Number of each 
type of contract 
121 25 146 195 205 400 546 
Total Areas (ha) 
102 18 120 141 152 
293  
Total household 74 27 985 144 110 2226 295 
 
                                                 
5 Sum of columns is different from total because of combination of share cropping and fixed-rent contracts by households 
6 Idem  
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Our data suggest also that liquidity constraints may have an effect on contractual 
choice on the demand side. A majority of households who are involved in sharecropping 
contract (58%) declare that they would have preferred a fixed-rent contract but they do not 
have enough money to finance the ex-ante payment of the rent. Thus sharecropping can be 
considered as a second best contract subject to the liquidity constrained tenants. On the 
contrary, 62 % of households involved in fixed-rent declare that fixed-rent is their first best 
contract. Liquidity constraints thus appears to limit contractual choice for constrained 
household; on the other hand, risk aversion doesn’t seem to have much of an influence in 
tenant decision regarding one contractual form or the other: risk effect is noted in only 18 of 
546 contract.  
3.3 Liquidity constraints  
Our database contains 290 households (65%) who participate in the credit market: 
formal and informal loan. 48% (205) of the households in our database participate into formal 
sector and 32% (145) of households have informal loans (with family member: 67% of 
informal loan). 60 households combine formal and informal loans.  
Formal credit market is driven by two microfinance institutions and two banks which 
allow many types of collaterals: oxen, land, other tradable assets...About land, all four formal 
institutions accept titled land but one of two microfinance institutions accept also land without 
title (land with a village and/or commune certificate) as collateral. Proximity between 
borrowers and this institution may explain this because it reduces information asymmetries. 
But, this fact can also have an effect on the manner household choose institution in which 
they would to borrow, the credit amount they receive and assets they would put as collateral. 
So, access to loan in this area depends on many factors such as household’s assets 
endowment, risk aversion…On the contrary to the common view in the development 
economics literature, this access doesn’t depend on the amount of owned land.  
Credit market is also characterized by imperfections and existence of credit 
constraints. This imperfections and constraints (lower amount received than requested, too 
long delay of treatment, and reputation of formal credit institutions…) may increase 
household’s liquidity constraints and then their land tenancy market participation.     
3.3.1 Definition     
The concept of liquidity constraints may cover several situations for the households. 
In our analysis, the concept of liquidity constraints refers to the various cases below, and takes 
into account the fact that a given household is involved or not in credit markets (formal and 
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informal). The methodology of elicitation of liquidity constraints is adapted from those 
developed in Boucher et al. (2009):  
a) When the household has at least one on going loan during the recall period  
We make the following assumptions about these households: they are rational, they 
request the amount they need and they don’t anticipate the fact that they may get a 
credit amount lower than requested by asking more. So, we define a household as 
“constrained household” if he gets an amount of credit lower than requested.   
b) When the household has not at least one on going loan during the recall period  
Because we have a potential problem with observability of credit demand for 
households not participating in credit markets, we define as liquidity constrained 
households those who meet either criterion below: 
b1)  Households have applied for a loan but their applications were rejected and 
there was no other source of credit. 
b2)  Households declare they are in need for credit but did not applied for a 
loan, for several reasons: (i) because they believe that their application 
would be rejected anyhow, (ii) because they don’t want to bear the risk to 
lose assets (collateral) in case of credit default, and (iii) because they had a 
previous failed experience with credit (repayment default, repayment 
delays, distress sale of asset in order to repay for the loan, loss of 
collateral). 
As these definitions show, participating in credit markets does not mean that the 
household has no liquidity constraints and, conversely, not participating does not mean that 
there is liquidity constraints.  
In addition to the constrained/not constrained dichotomy, we introduce the 
distinction between “ex ante constraint” and “ex-post constraint”. This distinction allows us to 
take into account the anticipated nature or not of the liquidity constraints. Ex-post constraints 
(bullets a and b1) refer to households whose constraints derive from credit rationing from the 
supply side (credit amounts lower than requested and up to outright rejection of credit 
application). This constraint is not anticipated and we expect that it may have a different 
effect on household behaviour than ex-ante constraints.  Ex-ante constraints (bullet b2) refer 
to households that self-exclude and do not apply for credit although they declare that they 
would need it.  
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On the other side, households with no liquidity constraints are those who participate 
in credit markets and have their desired amount and those who do not participate and don’t 
need loan.  
These definitions allow us to construct three variables: CHH (constrained household 
dummy), ACHH (ex-ante constrained household dummy) and PCHH (ex-post constrained 
household dummy). These variables take into account all aspects of liquidity constraints and 
go beyond the usual variables in the literature: the amount of credit received, the usual 
dichotomy access/ no access to credit in the literature (Kochar, 1997; Bellemare, 2009; 
Stephens and Barrett, 2011). We will test the effect of liquidity constraints on household land 
tenancy market participation using them sequentially: variable CHH first, ACHH and PCHH 
after.  
PCHH is considered to be exogenous because we assume that formal and informal 
lenders ignore land rental transaction in making their credit allocations. On the other side, 
there is a potential endogeneity problem with ACHH and CHH: the intuitive justification is 
that being liquidity constrained may be a choice variable and can be correlated with error 
terms of the land market participation.  
3.3.2 Liquidity constrained households and land tenancy market participation 
Table 2 reports the classification of sample household according to our liquidity 
constraints definition. It illustrates the fact that a given household who do not participate in 
credit market do not necessarily have liquidity constraints. In the other side, a given 
household who participate in credit market can have liquidity constraints. So, out of 290 
households who participate in credit markets, 116 (40%) are considered as liquidity 
constrained. On the opposite, out of the 158 households who do not participate in credit 
markets, 73 (53%) are not considered as liquidity constrained according to our definition.   
Table 2: households’ participation in credit markets and liquidity constraints (CHH) 
 Participation in credit market  Non-participation 
in credit markets  
Total 
 Formal Informal Total
7
 
Liquidity constrained households (CHH) 64 64 116 (40%) 73 (47%) 186 (42%) 
No liquidity constrained households 141 81 174 (60%) 85 (53%) 262 (58%) 
Total 205 145  290 (100%) 158 (100%) 448 (100%) 
 
                                                 
7 Sum of columns is different from total columns because of combination of different sources of credit by household: 60 
households combine formal and informal credit contracts.  
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Within 186 liquidity constrained households, 122 (66%) participate in land tenancy 
market either as landowner or tenants or both:  table 3 summarize this participation. 
Households who participate on the demand side (90) represent 74% of household who have 
liquidity constraint. Moreover, these households prefer sharecropping rather than fixed –rent 
contract. This can be related to the characteristics of these two contracts: sharecropping and 
fixed-rent. Indeed, in fixed-rent contracts the rent must be paid ex-ante in cash and it may be 
difficult for liquidity constrained households to do this. On the other side, in sharecropping 
contract, the rent is generally paid ex-post with the possibility to share the inputs cost. Then it 
may be preferable for a household who is liquidity constrained to choose this contract.       
Table 3: liquidity constraints and tenancy market participation 
 Demand side Supply side 
Type of contract Sharecropping Fixed-rent Total8 Sharecropping Fixed-rent Total9 
Constrained households 61 (42%) 42 (38%) 90 (41%) 34 (47%) 12 (44%) 43 (44%) 
No constrained 
households 
83 (58%) 68 (62%) 132 (59%) 39 (53%) 15 (56%) 54 (56%) 
Total  144 (100%) 110 (100%) 222 (100%) 73 (100%) 27 (100%) 
97 
(100%) 
 
Annex 1 reports a series of comparison on key variables between liquidity 
constrained and non-liquidity constrained households. Non-constrained household compared 
to constrained households more paddy field and participate more in formal credit market with 
higher amount. Liquidity constrained households participate more (land tenancy market) on 
the supply side than non-constrained households. This suggests that leasing out can be a way 
to solve liquidity constraints for landowners. On the demand side, liquidity constrained 
household do not appear to participate more in general, although they participate more under 
sharecropping contract. For liquidity constrained tenants, share tenancy may be a way to 
reduce these constraints by resources pooling, cost sharing and ex post payment of the rent.   
4 An empirical analysis of the effect of household liquidity constraints 
on their tenancy market participation  
4.1 Qualitative overview  
According to our qualitative data, the main contracts are sharecropping and fixed rent 
contracts. We have more sharecropping contracts (56) than fixed rent (49) contracts and most 
                                                 
8
 Sum of columns is different from total columns because of combination the two type of contract.  
9
 Sum of columns is different from total columns because of combination the two type of contract. 
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of these two types of contract concerns paddy fields. 86% of the fixed-rent contracts are 
characterized by an ex ante cash payment of the rent and all sharecropping contract by a 
sharing rates of output of 1/2.   
These qualitative surveys have enabled us to highlight the main determinants of 
household participation in the tenancy market. On the supply side, most of landowners argue 
that liquidity constrains, lacks of labour and productive assets are their main motivations to 
lease out land. Liquidity constraints in particular, have two effects on the household behavior 
in the tenancy market: when they are related to the financing of production and hired labour 
costs, households tend to choose a sharecropping contract; when they are rather linked to an 
urgent need of liquidity not related to production activities, landowners tend to choose fixed-
rent contract with ex ante payment of the rent. As a general pattern, landowners prefer 
sharecropping contract to fixed-rent contract because sharecropping allows them to get a 
higher expected rent, and to get an in-kind rent, particularly for rice production, which can be 
either sold or used for family consumption.  
On the demand side, fixed-rent contract appears as a first best but the households 
who faced liquidity constraints tend to choose sharecropping contract (ex-post payment of the 
rent) because they do not have enough money to pay for the ex-ante payment of the rent. The 
lack of productive assets or input (oxen, mechanization, labour…) is also evoked. The 
resources pooling in these contracts allows the tenant to reduce expense in tradable inputs for 
the agricultural production. On the other side, the role evoked in the literature by agricultural 
risk in contractual choice does not appear as a main determinant in our study area. This is in 
line with another study finding in the same area (Bellemare, 2007). 
In our data (qualitative and quantitative), we have more sharecropping contract than 
fixed-rent contract.  Bellemare (2009) relates the predominance of sharecropping contract in 
reverse tenancy sample to a weak property right effect from only the point of view of 
landowner. Our qualitative data, which take into account both the point of view of landowners 
and tenant, suggest otherwise, namely that the predominance of share tenancy contract can be 
more related to liquidity constraints for either the former or the latter or both. Tenure security 
is not mentioned as an important determinant of tenancy market participation in the supply 
side. 
So, the main determinant of household participation in the tenancy market in our 
study area can be related to factor endowments (land, credit, draft animals, mechanization and 
labour). About Liquidity constraints, it takes the form of leasing contracts with ex-ante 
payment for the landowners and share tenancy contracts for both landowner and tenant for 
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whom liquidity constraints is related to the financing of the production costs. On the supply 
side, the ex-ante payment of the rent in fixed-rent contracts can allow landowners with urgent 
needs of cash to solve this constraint. On the demand side, on the contrary, ex-ante payment 
in cash can limit participation of poor household. Thus, liquidity constraints influence 
participation and contractual choice of households in tenancy market in Lake Alaotra region. 
4.2 Econometric analysis 
4.2.1 On the supply side 
As notified earlier, we have a potential bias of underreporting of fixed-rent contract and this 
doesn’t allow us to have an econometric analysis on the supply side of land tenancy market. 
This potential bias could reduce the efficiency of the contractual choice estimation on the 
supply side. However, in our questionnaire, we have questions about household rationales in 
leasing out. According to these contract level data (table 5), the main motivation in contracts 
data to lease out is liquidity constraints (60%)
10
. Constraints nature influence also contractual 
choice. Constrained household who have liquidity constraints related to the operation of a 
given plot choose sharecropping and those who have urgent need of liquidity choose fixed-
rent with ex-ante payment of the rent. This type of fixed-rent contract can be called “distress 
renting”.  
Table 5: households’ motivations to lease out (contract level) 
  Motivations  Sharecropping  Fixed-rent Total 
Lease out related to 
liquidity constraints  
Lack of liquidity to finance 
production cost 
27 6 
88 (60%) 
Lack of labour and lack of 
liquidity to finance hired labour 
43 5 
Urgent need of liquidity -- 9 
To repay credit -- 3 
Lease out non related to 
liquidity constraints 
Lack of productive asset 26  
61 (40%) 
Mutual aid arrangement 15  
Plot too far from house  14  
Others reasons 8  
Total  121
11
 (100%) 28
12
 (100%) 149 (100%) 
 
                                                 
10
 This result comes from our quantitative survey where households who lease were asked about about their motivations to 
lease out. 
11
 Some tenant-households have many motivations in sharecropping 
12
 Some tenant-households have many motivations in fixed-rent 
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So, among households who lease out, those who have liquidity constraints related to the 
financing of the agricultural production of the plot are more likely to lease out land under a 
share tenancy contract than non-constrained households. However if liquidity constraints is 
related to an urgent need of liquidity, they may prefer a fixed-rent contract with ex-ante 
payment. Participation on the supply side is then an alternative to liquidity constraints. This 
liquidity constraint effect can induce an increase of amount of the rent and then some 
difficulties for poor tenants to lease in land. 
4.2.2 On the demand side 
On the demand side, our data allows us to make econometric analysis on the effect of 
liquidity constraints on household’s tenancy market participation. 
4.2.2.1 Model specification and variables   
On this side of the tenancy market, credit market (formal and informal) outcomes 
(credit refusal, lower amount, and denial to participation…) is assumed to have also an effect 
on household’s decision on tenancy market. These decisions are then treated after the 
realisation of the credit outcomes as described below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
At the beginning of the growing season, after the realisation of the credit market 
outcomes, we assume that households have a sequential decision process about their 
participation in the tenancy market: firstly, households decide to rent in or not; secondly, after 
this first choice, they choose the area to lease in and the contract in which they would lease in: 
sharecropping or fixed-rent. 
No  
Share tenancy contract Fixed-rent contract 
Yes  
Participation intensity 
rent in  
Household’s decision in land tenancy markets: lease in  
Credit market outcomes  
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the interactions between credit market outcomes and 
household’s participation in land markets (demand side) 
 
 Area lease in  
Contractual choice on demand side 
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The empirical literature (Skoufias, 1995; Kochar, 1997; Deininger et al., 2003; Teklu 
and Lemi, 2004; Masterson, 2007; Holden et al., 2009) provides us a basis for specifying the 
equations determining land rental outcomes which are assumed to be mainly a function of the 
household's resource endowment at the start of the cropping year and hence prior to the land 
rental decision. These resources include (Annex 2): 
 Human capital and demographic structure of household 
The variables AGE, EDUC and FORM_AGRI measure respectively the age, the 
duration of schooling (years) and the additional training made in agriculture by the household 
head. We assume as in other studies that AGE and EDUC may have a nonlinear effect on 
tenancy market participation. So we also include the squared terms of both variables to test 
this effect. The additional training made in agriculture can lead the household to prefer fixed-
rent contract in order to highlight their skills. We include also household size (HHSIZE) as a 
proxy of his labor endowment and two dummy variables for female household head (FemHH) 
and income from off farm activities (OFF_FARM).  
 Land endowment 
We use the proportion of paddy irrigated land in the household land endowment 
(PADDY_FIELD). This variable is assumed to have a negative effect on the probability to 
lease in and the area leased in. 
 Other assets endowment  
The stock of agricultural asset is an important determinant of household’s 
participation in land tenancy market in the literature. We used 5 variables to test this effect: 
dummy variables LAWN_TRACTOR and OXEN which respectively define the fact that a 
household have at least one LAWN_TRACTOR or one OXEN. NUM_LAWN_TRACTOR 
and NUM_OXEN define respectively the number of LAWN_TRACTOR and OXEN owned 
by the household. LOG_ASSET_VALUE takes into account the logarithm of total value of 
household’s agricultural assets.  
 Village and commune effect 
Land rental decision may also reflect levels of agricultural productivity in a given 
area: village, commune (Kochar, 1997). So, we also included variables at village level and 
commune level. A village level, we used population size (POPSIZE) as a proxy of the size of 
the land rental market activity and village dummy (VILLAGE) in order to control at the 
village level, for the lack of data on plots quality. At commune level, we included the 
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coefficient of variation of two last rainy seasons 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 (CV_RAIN). This 
variable allow taking into account agricultural risk in household’s decision.  
4.2.2.2 Econometric model 
 Land market participation 
The conceptual framework leads us to use a Heckman selection model to test the 
effect of liquidity constraints on the probability of participation and the area leased in. The 
model is as follow:  
 
We have first, the equation of land area leased in: 
 
            
           
where   is the actual level of transaction ( ) for households who leased in 
and 0 otherwise.  is the households liquidity constraints dummy (credit market outcome), 
 a vector of regressors evoked above,  the error term, and and the set of parameters to 
be estimated. 
 
Heckman procedure involves estimation of the probability model for the decision to lease in 
or not, calculation of the inverse Mill’s Ratio (sample selection bias), and incorporation of 
this variable into the model for the OLS estimation of the area leased in  (  in order to 
correct for the selection bias induced by considering only the sample of tenant.  
The model of participation is as follow: 
 
where  is a dichotomous variable indicating the ith farmer’s decision of leasing in 
the land tenancy market, with  = 1 standing for participation on the demand side, and 
= 0 for otherwise. is a vector of regressors,  the error term, and and the 
set of parameters to be estimated. 
For this equation, the inverse Mill’s Ratio is:  
Where    and   are density and cumulative density functions, respectively. This ratio is 
included as an additional regressor in the land intensity regression conditional on  = 
1. 
 
y *
1
Lei
K ·
. 1
lease in
lease in
lease in
area leased in
({J = 0'( ° iI.Ci+ Pi X i)
(1) (Oi LCi+ Pi X D
(1)
(2)
lease in
(3)
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where the variables in are allowed to differ from those in . 
The testable assumptions are as follows: on the demand side, liquidity constrained households 
are less likely to lease in land than non-constrained households (expected sign of   is 
negative) and among households who lease in, those who have liquidity constraints lease in 
less land than non-constrained households (expected sign of is negative). Estimations are 
presented in annex 3. 
Seeing that CHH and ACHH are dummy variables and are common on the selection and 
censored equations, the model named “Endogenous Switching Type II-Tobit” would give 
better estimations  (Kim, 2006).  This model is “a hybrid of Heckman (1978)’s “multivariate 
probit model with structural shift” and a type II-tobit model and provide a simple two step 
estimator which is easy to implement and robust compared to other alternative estimators” 
(Kim, 2006: 281). This model is being built and IV results will be presented in a forthcoming 
version of this paper. 
 Contractual choice in the land market 
Household who decide to lease in have to choose between a sharecropping contract 
and a fixed-rent contract. This choice is represented by the variable Sharecropping which 
take the value 1 if it is a sharecropping which is chosen and 0 if it is a fixed rent contract.  The 
expected methodology might be similar to that developed earlier for the area leased in but in 
the second stage we used a probit model rather than OLS because of the nature of our variable 
(dummy). However, the Wald test of independence (annex 4) equations is not conclusive 
about this methodology. So, we turn to a probit model to test our hypothesis. We expected 
here that  will be positive. Indeed, among households who lease in, those who have 
liquidity constraints are more likely to lease in land under a share tenancy contract than non-
constrained households ( ). This is due to the fact that share tenancy delays the 
payment at the end of the crop season (quasi-loan) on the contrary of fixed-rent contract 
where the payment of the rent is ex-ante.  Also, share-tenancy contracts may include some 
cost-sharing features which can be interpreted of as a way to solve liquidity constraints. 
Seeing that the endogenous regressors and the outcome variable (sharecropping) are 
dummy variables, the usual instrumental variable estimators are not consistent. So, to avoid 
potential endogeneity with ACHH and CHH, we rely on methodology which combines impact 
analysis methodology when the treatment effect is endogenous (definition of a treatment 
effect equation) and a bivariate probit model. Results are presented in annex 6.      
K-r
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4.2.2.3 Results and discussion 
 
 On the effect of Liquidity constraints and tenancy market participation (Annexe 3) 
The fact to be liquidity constrained (all three variables) seems to do not have any 
significant effect on household’s land tenancy market participation. This result however 
should be taken with caution because of the potential endogeneity of this variable. 
About other variables, human capital and demographic structure variables have 
various effects on household’s participation in land tenancy market. HHSIZE is a proxy of the 
availability of labour in the household. This variable has a significant positive effect on the 
area leased in and this means that the availability of family labor allows the leasing (in) of 
more land instead of the using of this liquidity to take hired labour. Age does not have an 
effect on the area leased in and household who have off farm activities don’t lease more land 
than the others. EDUC and EDUCsquare measure the management capacity of the household. 
So, household who have a certain level of education (EDUCsquare) may have another 
financing source and then, they can lease more land. However, household who have off farm 
activities seems to do not lease more land. This is closely related to the fact that off farm 
activities are their main income source. 
We also notice that assets (NUM_OXEN and NUM_LAWN_TRACTOR) have 
significant positive effects on the area leased in. This asset endowment is essential in the 
study area and allow household to undertake agricultural production regardless constraints 
which can exist in these assets markets (renting).  
 
On the probability of participation in tenancy market, AGE has a negative impact on 
renting in and can be related to an experience effect if we consider that experience increase 
with the age. This is supported by the fact that AGEsquare has a positive effect on the 
probability to participate to the land tenancy market. FORM_AGRI which is another 
managerial capacity indicator has also a positive effect on the leasing in probability.  
Our village and commune variable (POPSIZE and CV_RAIN) have positive effect 
on the probability of leasing in. Indeed, the size of the village is an indicator of the size of the 
local land market; the fact that a village has many people may induce a pressure on land and 
so a demand for land. Between household who lease in, those who are in the first quintile of 
income lease in less land (quint1).   
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 On the effect of liquidity constraints and contractual choice on tenancy market 
(annex 5 & 6) 
The fact to be liquidity constrained has a significant effect on household’s probability to 
choose sharecropping only in our IV estimations (Annex 6). However the Hausman 
specification test (annex 7) doesn’t allow us to tell which estimator is the best.  
 
In annex 5, human capital and demographic structure and assets variables don’t have 
significant effect on the probability to contract under sharecropping contract. Village and 
commune level variables increase however the probability to choose sharecropping. 
CV_RAIN is a proxy of agricultural production risk. When CV_RAIN increases, the risk of 
flooding may increase also. So household may choose sharecropping in order to mitigate this 
risk. 
Off farm activities increase household’s probability to contract under fixed-rent. 
Indeed, off farm activities is an income source and can allow them to pay for the rent. 
Household who has also more paddy field prefer contract under fixed-rent contract. The 
holding of (lot of) paddy fields in this area may be an indicator of wealth, so the sign of 
OFF_FARM may mean that richer household prefer fixed-rent contract and other 
sharecropping contract. However, the first income quintile variable (quint1) indicate, that 
those who earns the less can choose a fixed rent contract. This is a surprising result but it can 
be explained by the fact that it exist several types of land in the tenancy market. While paddy 
fields are the most common type of land, there exists other which is lower quality. We have 
here an adjustment effect which mean that household who are constrained can choose a fixed-
rent contract but with a lower land quality or lower areas.   
  
Annex 6 provides us a joint estimation of the probability to choose sharecropping 
and the probability to be constrained. These results show an effect of the fact to be 
constrained on contract choice. Household who are liquidity constrained prefer sharecropping 
rather than fixed-rent contract. Cost sharing and the fact that fixed rent must be paid ex ante 
are the main motivations as shown above. As in annex 5 we have also the same effect for 
OFF-FARM, PADDY_FIELD and quint1.   
These estimations allow us also to undertake an exploration of the determinants of 
being constrained or not. The results show that the time taken to go to the nearest formal 
institution (TIMECREDIT), the fact to have less income (quint1), the have land without 
formal document (INFORMAL DOC_Land) and off-farm activities (OFF_FARM) increase 
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the probability to be constrained. Informal land documents do not prevent household to take 
formal credit because it is possible in this area to put as collateral informal land document 
(document with village or commune stamp). However they may have a lower amount than 
household who can give as collateral formal land document (FORMAL DOC_Land).     
5 Conclusion  
Households’ tenancy market participation is related to their liquidity constraints. 
These constraints (form and nature) have different effect on households’ participation. On the 
supply side, they increase the probability to lease out land and have effects on household’s 
contractual choice. On the demand side, liquidity constraints do not have significant effect on 
the probability to lease in land but they are one the main determinants on contractual choice 
between sharecropping and fixed-rent. Tenancy market allows households to overcome credit 
markets imperfections. In this, share tenancy is compromise for both the tenant and the 
landowner. So public policies must not be targeted to a particular sector (land or credit 
market) but must take into account the interactions of land and financial needs in household’s 
strategies. 
Bellemare (2009) connect reverse share tenancy to the question of tenure security in 
the Lac Alaotra from only landowner point of view. Our results show that the importance of 
share tenancy is more related to liquidity constraints faced for both the tenant and the 
landowner. Moreover, in our qualitative survey, tenure security is not the main determinant of 
tenancy market participation. The interesting questions which emerges are how tenant and 
landowner meet each other and what are the terms of the arrangements (cost sharing or not). 
These issues will be our future research.  .  
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Annex 1: Constrained and non-constrained household (total sample) 
 
 
 Total sample (448) 
No constrained household 
(262) 
Constrained household 
(186) 
Test 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.  
AGE: Household head 44,38 12,31 44,73 12,35 43,89 12,27  
OFF_FARM: dummy equal to one if off-farm 
activities 
0,52 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,55 0,50  
PADDY_FIELD: proportion of paddy field in 
land holding 
0,29 0,29 0,31 0,28 0,27 0,30 +** 
FORMAL CREDIT: equal to one if household has 
a formal credit 
0,55 0,50 0,60 0,49 0,47 0,50 +*** 
INFORMAL CREDI : equal to one if household 
has an informal credit 
0,30 0,46 0,28 0,45 0,32 0,47  
Credit amount obtain formal sector (Ariary
13
) 584001,00 1220590,00 679831,90 1385090,00 451468,90 934725,00 +** 
Credit amount obtain in informal sector (Ariary) 41305,38 128541,80 41709,85 133650,10 40746,01 121473,30  
Lease out dummy 0,23 0,42 0,20 0,40 0,27 0,44 --* 
Lease in dummy 0,50 0,50 0,49 0,50 0,51 0,50  
Fixed-rent dummy (lease out) 0,05 0,22 0,04 0,20 0,06 0,25  
Fixed-rent dummy (lease in) 0,29 0,45 0,31 0,46 0,26 0,44  
Sharecropping dummy (lease out) 0,19 0,39 0,17 0,37 0,21 0,41  
Sharecropping dummy (lease in) 0,29 0,46 0,27 0,44 0,33 0,47 --* 
OXEN : equal to 1 if household has an oxen 0,48 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,44 0,50  
The last column contains t-tests /proportion test of the difference of the mean from the non-constrained and constrained household samples for each 
variable. As such, a plus (minus) sign indicates that the mean of the variable is significantly higher (lower) in non-constrained sample than constrained 
sample. *10%, **5% and ***1%. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 1euro 2500Ar 
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Annex 2: Tenants sample 
 
Variable  Obs Mean Std.Dev. 
Area_leased Area leased in by the household 224 1,31 1,33 
Fixed_rent contract Equal to 1 if household has a fixed-rent contract 224 0,58 0,50 
Sharecropping Equal to 1 if household has a sharecropping contract 224 0,59 0,49 
CHH Equal to 1 if household is liquidity constrained 224 0,43 0,50 
PCHH Equal to 1 if household is “ex post” liquidity constrained 224 0,28 0,45 
ACHH Equal to 1 if household is “ex ante” liquidity constrained 224 0,17 0,38 
AGE Age of the household 223 42,05 11,22 
FemHH Equal to 1 if household head is female  224 0,05 0,23 
HHSIZE Household size 224 6,86 2,61 
EDUC Time spend in school (years) 216 6,59 3,29 
OFF_FARM Equal to 1 if household has off farm activities  224 0,53 0,50 
FORM_AGRI Equal to one if household head received an additional training in agriculture 224 0,21 0,41 
PADDY_FIELD Proportion of paddy irrigated land in the household land endowment 184 0,25 0,28 
OXEN Equal to 1 if household has at least one oxen 224 0,54 0,50 
NUM_OXEN Number of oxen of the household 224 2,00 2,33 
LAWN_TRACTOR Equal to 1 if household has at least one lawn tractor 224 0,12 0,33 
NUM_LAWN_TRACTOR Number of lawn tractor of the household 224 0,15 0,45 
LOG_ASSET_VALUE Logarithm of the total value of agricultural assets 220 14,45 2,43 
ASSETLOOSE Equal to 1 if household loose an assets in the last twelve months and could not replace it 224 0,33 0,47 
TIMECREDIT Time taken (minute by bicycle) to go to the nearest formal credit institution 224 52,16 25,22 
POPSIZE Village population size 224 2720,76 1306,78 
CV_RAIN  Coefficient of variation of the two last rainy seasons 2006/2007 and 2007/2008 224 -21,62 6,10 
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Annex 3: Heckman estimation of household’s participation and area leased in 
 
 Estimation with CHH Estimation with ACHH and PCHH 
VARIABLES Area leased in Lease in Area leased in Lease in 
CHH 0.0558 0.140   
 (0.185) (0.148)   
ACHH   0.225 0.0668 
   (0.282) (0.215) 
PCHH   -0.00597 0.124 
   (0.202) (0.166) 
HHSIZE 0.103* 0.0817** 0.106* 0.0821** 
 (0.0587) (0.0349) (0.0591) (0.0349) 
AGE 0.0147 -0.113*** 0.0181 -0.114*** 
 (0.0677) (0.0412) (0.0679) (0.0414) 
AGEsquare -0.000620 0.000816** -0.000659 0.000829** 
 (0.000620) (0.000413) (0.000622) (0.000415) 
EDUC -0.200* 0.0574 -0.185 0.0575 
 (0.112) (0.0737) (0.113) (0.0737) 
EDUCsquare 0.0179** -0.00176 0.0171** -0.00177 
 (0.00766) (0.00555) (0.00771) (0.00554) 
OFF_FARM -0.619*** -0.173 -0.625*** -0.171 
 (0.199) (0.157) (0.199) (0.158) 
PADDY_FIELD -0.455 -0.449* -0.413 -0.454* 
 (0.372) (0.271) (0.374) (0.272) 
OXEN  0.361  0.353 
  (0.276)  (0.277) 
LAWN_TRACTOR  -0.0945  -0.104 
  (0.259)  (0.259) 
FORM_AGRI  0.340*  0.335* 
  (0.189)  (0.190) 
LOG_ASSET_VALUE  0.0359  0.0373 
  (0.0636)  (0.0637) 
POPSIZE  0.00144**  0.00141** 
  (0.000690)  (0.000698) 
CV_RAIN -0.0188 0.161* -0.0182 0.158 
 (0.0254) (0.0973) (0.0253) (0.0984) 
NUM_OXEN 0.119**  0.120**  
 (0.0494)  (0.0494)  
NUM_LAWN_TRACTOR 0.947***  0.943***  
 (0.214)  (0.213)  
quint1 -1.080*** -0.390 -1.106*** -0.378 
 (0.378) (0.273) (0.378) (0.278) 
quint2 -0.582* -0.118 -0.563* -0.114 
 (0.300) (0.243) (0.299) (0.243) 
quint3 -0.235 -0.137 -0.223 -0.132 
 (0.274) (0.229) (0.273) (0.229) 
quint4 -0.0577 -0.0397 -0.0595 -0.0357 
 (0.263) (0.220) (0.262) (0.220) 
Mills (lambda) 0.729  0.712  
 (0.670)  (0.676)  
Constant 1.277 -0.701 1.146 -0.656 
 (1.341) (1.418) (1.343) (1.424) 
Observations 370 370 370 370 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Village dummy are includes but not reported 
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Annex 4: Heckprob estimation of the contractual choice 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Village dummy are included but not reported 
 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.08   Prob > chi2 = 0.7781  (CHH estimation) 
Wald test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) =     0.27   Prob > chi2 = 0.6025  (ACHH and PCHH estimation) 
 
 Estimation with CHH Estimation with ACHH and PCHH 
VARIABLES Sharecropping Lease in Sharecropping Lease in 
     
CHH 0.220 0.106   
 (0.324) (0.166)   
ACHH   -0.00404 0.100 
   (0.366) (0.151) 
PCHH   0.237 0.0407 
   (0.305) (0.192) 
HHSIZE -0.0568 0.0657* -0.0566 0.0661* 
 (0.286) (0.0384) (0.171) (0.0390) 
AGE 0.0563 -0.144** 0.0441 -0.142** 
 (0.318) (0.0630) (0.190) (0.0562) 
AGEsquare -0.000632 0.00119* -0.000509 0.00117* 
 (0.00284) (0.000655) (0.00171) (0.000603) 
EDUC -0.0332 0.126 -0.0426 0.126 
 (0.352) (0.124) (0.209) (0.125) 
EDUCsquare -0.000526 -0.00773 2.87e-05 -0.00764 
 (0.0213) (0.0101) (0.0139) (0.00997) 
OFF_FARM -0.506 -0.210 -0.483** -0.208 
 (0.336) (0.276) (0.243) (0.257) 
PADDY_FIELD -0.858 -0.527 -0.908* -0.532 
 (0.717) (0.397) (0.519) (0.328) 
OXEN  0.0973  0.0956 
  (0.247)  (0.243) 
LAWN_TRACTOR  -0.195  -0.198 
  (0.537)  (0.467) 
FORM_AGRI  0.540  0.536* 
  (0.439)  (0.289) 
LOG_ASSET_VALUE  0.114*  0.114* 
  (0.0603)  (0.0588) 
POPSIZE  0.00162***  0.00165*** 
  (0.000258)  (0.000254) 
CV_RAIN -0.00870 0.205*** -0.0106 0.209*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0439) (0.0242) (0.0373) 
NUM_OXEN -0.0220  -0.0189  
 (0.213)  (0.134)  
NUM_LAWN_TRACTOR -0.153  -0.139  
 (0.171)  (0.175)  
quint1 -1.109** -0.566** -1.070** -0.574** 
 (0.546) (0.266) (0.439) (0.264) 
quint2 -0.488 -0.200 -0.507 -0.203 
 (0.512) (0.295) (0.475) (0.282) 
quint3 -0.588** -0.389** -0.597** -0.387** 
 (0.272) (0.191) (0.254) (0.154) 
quint4 -0.881 -0.202 -0.848 -0.205 
 (0.978) (0.193) (0.632) (0.183) 
Constant 0.292 -0.812 0.539 -0.879 
 (3.177) (1.501) (2.445) (1.278) 
athrho 1.161  1.257  
 (4.119)  (2.413)  
Observations 370 370 370 370 
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Annex 5: Probit estimation of contractual choice 
 
 Estimation with CHH Estimation with ACHH and PCHH 
VARIABLES Sharecropping Sharecropping 
   
CHH 0.248  
 (0.238)  
ACHH  0.132 
  (0.231) 
PCHH  0.207 
  (0.250) 
HHSIZE 0.00632 0.00726 
 (0.0492) (0.0485) 
AGE -0.0564 -0.0579 
 (0.0423) (0.0425) 
AGEsquare 0.000426 0.000445 
 (0.000465) (0.000462) 
EDUC 0.0482 0.0503 
 (0.116) (0.117) 
EDUCsquare -0.00393 -0.00410 
 (0.00862) (0.00858) 
OFF_FARM -0.434** -0.427** 
 (0.202) (0.202) 
PADDY_FIELD -0.671* -0.686** 
 (0.347) (0.331) 
OXEN -0.00123 -0.0257 
 (0.504) (0.507) 
LAWN_TRACTOR -0.200 -0.212 
 (0.469) (0.473) 
FORM_AGRI 0.339 0.330 
 (0.215) (0.231) 
LOG_ASSET_VALUE 0.0215 0.0258 
 (0.118) (0.118) 
POPSIZE 0.000785** 0.000741** 
 (0.000355) (0.000342) 
CV_RAIN 0.0862* 0.0799* 
 (0.0480) (0.0469) 
FemHH -0.301 -0.310 
 (0.531) (0.517) 
quint1 -1.005*** -0.992*** 
 (0.351) (0.354) 
quint2 -0.357 -0.349 
 (0.373) (0.367) 
quint3 -0.520*** -0.513*** 
 (0.151) (0.150) 
quint4 -0.620** -0.615** 
 (0.314) (0.308) 
Constant 0.0825 0.136 
 (1.618) (1.630) 
Observations 370 370 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Village dummy are includes but not reported 
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Annex 6: estimation of contractual choice (IV estimator) 
 
 IV estimation of CHH IV estimation of ACHH 
VARIABLES Sharecropping CHH Sharecropping ACHH 
     
CHH 1.360**    
 (0.568)    
PCHH   0.182  
   (0.173)  
ACHH   0.116  
   (1.080)  
HHSIZE 0.0256 0.0284 0.0460 -0.00367 
 (0.0368) (0.0341) (0.0378) (0.0455) 
AGE -0.0249 0.0133 -0.0285 -0.0338 
 (0.0414) (0.0385) (0.0465) (0.0484) 
AGEsquare 4.49e-05 -0.000167 1.81e-05 0.000417 
 (0.000416) (0.000384) (0.000469) (0.000484) 
EDUC -0.00745 -0.0522 -0.0314 -0.0312 
 (0.0746) (0.0733) (0.0791) (0.101) 
EDUCsquare 0.000949 0.00209 0.00181 -0.000621 
 (0.00546) (0.00557) (0.00590) (0.00823) 
OFF_FARM -0.398** 0.180 -0.386* 0.589*** 
 (0.163) (0.158) (0.203) (0.224) 
PADDY_FIELD -0.297 -0.397 -0.580* -0.492 
 (0.341) (0.260) (0.305) (0.363) 
OXEN 0.105  0.0903  
 (0.245)  (0.302)  
LAWN_TRACTOR 0.0755  -0.0188  
 (0.254)  (0.281)  
FORM_AGRI 0.147  0.234  
 (0.194)  (0.204)  
LOG_ASSET_VALUE 0.00524  0.00338  
 (0.0562)  (0.0682)  
POPSIZE 0.000482  0.000617  
 (0.000701)  (0.000858)  
CV_RAIN 0.0397 -0.0778 0.0423 -0.214* 
 (0.0960) (0.0805) (0.121) (0.113) 
FemHH -0.0383  -0.0178  
 (0.280)  (0.333)  
ASSETLOOSE  0.109  -0.0879 
  (0.152)  (0.210) 
TIMECREDIT  0.0116  0.0485** 
  (0.0181)  (0.0243) 
NUM_OXEN  -0.0258  -0.00851 
  (0.0304)  (0.0418) 
NUM_LAWN_TRACTOR  -0.221  -0.313 
  (0.179)  (0.321) 
FORMAL DOC_LAnd  -0.359*  -0.203 
  (0.202)  (0.317) 
INFORMAL DOC_LAnd  0.406***  -0.285 
  (0.139)  (0.197) 
quint1 -0.608** 0.425 -0.523 1.161*** 
 (0.274) (0.260) (0.418) (0.367) 
quint2 -0.114 0.166 -0.0699 0.490 
 (0.237) (0.242) (0.280) (0.351) 
quint3 -0.257 0.313 -0.175 0.362 
 (0.222) (0.232) (0.256) (0.348) 
quint4 -0.293 0.114 -0.267 0.400 
 (0.218) (0.225) (0.245) (0.339) 
Constant -0.943 -2.722 -0.709 -7.153* 
 (1.366) (2.740) (1.713) (3.743) 
Observations 370 370 370 370 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Annex 7: Hausman test of specification (CHH estimation) 
 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
  chi2(24) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =10.58 
  Prob>chi2 = 0.9917 
  (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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